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Yankees Out of North America: Foreign Employer Job
Discrimination Against American Citizens
After the Supreme Court's decision in Sumitomo Shoji America,
Inc. v. Avagliano, 1 foreign investors2 are forced to consider the effect
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19643 has on the hiring practices of
their American companies.4 The decision is significant because a foreign parent corporation may wish to fill key positions5 in its American
1. 457 U.S. 176 (1982). The respondent's name in the lower court opinion is misspelled.
Throughout this Note, the proper spelling is used. Hence, the spelling is corrected from "Avigliano" to "Avagliano." See N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1982, at Dl, col. 3.
2. The terms "foreign investors" or "foreign employers," as used in this Note, refer to foreign investors who have a controlling interest in companies incorporated in the United States.
The Japan Economic Institute of America has recently indicated that, as of 1980, Japanese investors owned a controlling interest in 213 United States manufacturing companies. See S.
MACKNIGHT, JAPAN'S EXPANDING MANUFACTURING PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A
PROFILE 2 (1981) (Published by the Japan Economic Insitute of America) [hereinafter cited as as
JAPAN PROFILE).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
4. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether treaty privileges provide a defense to a
Title VII employment discrimination suit against an American subsidiary of a foreign corporation. Sumitomo, a domestically incorporated subsidiary of a Japanese parent, defended a sex and
national origin discrimination suit by claiming that article VIII(l) of the Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce, and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, United States-Japan, 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863
[hereinafter referred to as FCN Treaty], gave it broad discretion to hire employees of its choice.
457 U.S. at 179. The Supreme Court resolved conflicting interpretations of article VIIl(l) of the
FCN Treaty, compare Avagli~o v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981)
(article VIII(l) applies to do#~~tically incorporated foreign subsidiary, but does not insulate
subsidiary from Title VII), vdcdied 457 U.S. 176 (1982), with Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), 643
F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981) (article VIII(l) allows a domestically incorporated foreign subsidiary to
discriminate in favor of foreign nationals for essential positions.), vacated, 457 U.S. 1128 (1982).
The Court held that article VIII(l) does not apply to domestically incorporated subsidiaries of
Japanese companies and thus cannot protect the subsidiary from Title VII liability. The
Supreme Court refused to reach the question, however, of whether Sumitomo's hiring practices
violated Title VII. 457 U.S. at 180 n.4; see note 9 infra and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court reserved the question of whether a domestically incorporated subsidiary
can assert its parent's rights under the FCN Treaty. 457 U.S. at 189 n.19. This right has been
asserted by C. Itoh & Co. See Spiess v. C. ltoh & Co. (Am.), 687 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1982). A
related question is whether United States courts could first require the parent company to conform to article 3 of Japan's Labor Standards Act, which forbids discrimination on the basis of
nationality. For a discussion of Japan's Labor Standards Act, see generally Brown, Japanese
Approaches to Equal Rights for Women: The Legal Framework. 12 LAW JAPAN: ANN. 29
(1979). The Supreme Court's decision in Sumitomo has broad implications for domesticallyincorporated foreign subsidiaries. See, e.g., Shell Petroleum, N.V. v. Graves, 709 F.2d 593, 596
(9th Cir.) (Netherland corporation holding majority interest in two American companies is on
equal footing with domestic corporations under Sumitomo and thus has no standing to seek relief
from California's unitary tax), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 537 (1983); Swearingen v. United States,
565 F. Supp. 1019, 1021 (D. Colo. 1983) (Sumitomo rule of construction may apply to executive
agreements implementing treaty provisions). Lawyers familiar with the issue in Sumitomo have
commented that the ruling might be viewed by other nations as an attempt to water-down treaty
rights. See Wall St. J., June 16, 1982, at 8, col. 1.
5. Throughout this Note, the terms "key employees" or "key positions" refer to those homecountry employees admitted to the United States or those positions provided for under the
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subsidiary with employees from the parent's home country. The parent may wish to depend on such employees because they have "familiarity with not only the language of [the parent country], but also the
culture, customs, and business practices of that country." 6 The justification for turning away American job applicants would likely be that
they either lack the requisite business and cultural familiarity with the
parent country or that they are not citizens of the parent country. 7 As
in Sumitomo, Americans may challenge a hiring preference for homecountry employees, 8 claiming that the preference violates Title VIl's
prohibition of national origin discrimination. 9
This Note explores Title VII's relationship to the hiring practices
of foreign employers. 10 It focuses on Japanese employers, who might
"treaty trader'' provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA): executives, supervisors, and specialists. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(E)(i) (1982). See note 30 infra and accompanying
text.
6. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 189 n.19.
7. As this Note frames the practice, an employer requiring business and cultural familiarity
would recruit applicants who speak Japanese and who are knowledgeable of Japanese business
practices and customs. The employer hiring only Japanese citizens, by contrast, would tum
away even those with business and cultural familiarity if they were not Japanese citizens. For
obvious reasons, these two practices are mutually exclusive for a given employer. If an excluded
job applicant brought a Title VII action against the employer for discriminatory hiring practices,
the employer's justification for the challenged practice would likely be that the business and
cultural familiarity requirement or the citizenship requirement was a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for refusing employment to those without the requisite qualifications. For a list of
some of the factors essential to the business and cultural familiarity requirement, see note 66

infra.

\ ..

8. See, e.g., Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co., (Am.), 643 F.2d 353 ~4..% Cir. 1981), vacated, 451 U.S.
1128 (1982) (remanded for reconsideration in light of Sumitomo); cf Linskey v. Heidelberg
Eastern, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 1181 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (age and national origin discrimination by
Danish corporation); Dowling v. United States, 476 F. Supp. 1018 (D. Mass. 1979) ("citizenship" discrimination by World Hockey League and others); Novak v. World Bank, 20 Empl.
Prac. Dec. (CCH), ~ 30,021 (D.D.C. 1979) (national origin discrimination by the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development).
9. In Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 180 n.4, the Court did not reach the question of whether discrimination on the basis of Japanese citizenship violates Title VIl's prohibition of national origin
discrimination. See note 4 supra. The Court would have had no occasion to consider the validity
of a business and cultural familiarity requirement as Sumitomo imposed a citizenship requirement.
Aside from Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982), might also be available to plaintiffs alleging
national origin discrimination. A split of authority exists, however, on the question of whether
§ 1981 recognizes a cause of action for national origin discrimination. Compare Avagliano v.
Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (no cause of action for non-Japanese), ajfd. on other grounds, 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 176
(1982), and Budinsky v. Corning Glass Works, 425 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (no cause of
action for Slavic-Americans), and Kurylas v. Department of Agriculture, 373 F. Supp. 1072
(D.D.C. 1974) (no cause of action for Polish-Americans), affd., 514 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
with Gonzalez v. Stanford Applied Engg., Inc., 597 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1979), and Enriguez v.
Honeywell, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 901 (W.D. Okla. 1977) (both recognizing a cause of action for
Hispanics who can show element of racial discrimination). This Note does not address this
question.
10. For other literature dealing with this issue, see Note, Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (America),
Inc.: Another Chapter in the Continuing Conflict Between FCN Treaties and Title VII, 10 DEN. J.
INTL. L. & POLY. 585 (1981); Note, Beyond the FCN Treaty: Japanese Multinationals Under
Title Vil, 51 FORDHAM L. REv. 871 (1983); Recent Developments, International Agreements:
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face the toughest Title VII challenge to a business and cultural familiarity or citizenship requirement. Part I sets out arguments for and
against finding intentional discrimination - disparate treatment 11 in either of these hiring requirements. It suggests that a court should
refuse to find national origin discrimination when the employer imposes a business and cultural familiarity requirement. However, when
an applicant is denied employment solely on the basis of citizenship, a
strong argument may be made that the employer is using the citizenship requirement as a pretext for intentional discrimination. Part II
considers whether prohibited discrimination may exist on disparate
impact12 grounds when a court has not found discriminatory intent
Legal Status of Locally-Incorporated Subsidiaries, 23 HARV. INTL. L.J. 431 (1983); Note, Commercial Treaties and the American Civil Rights Laws: The Case ofJapanese Employers, 31 STAN.
L. REv. 947 (1979) [hereinafter referred to as Note, Commercial Treaties]. See also Sethi &
Swanson, Are Foreign Multinationals Violating U.S. Civil Rights Lows, 4 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J.
485 (1979).
11. To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment, the plaintiff must show employer
acts from which the court can infer that discriminatory intent underlies the employment decision. The central issue is whether the employer is treating "some people less favorably than
others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). This discriminatory motive may be established by showing that the plaintiff: (i) belongs to a protected class; (ii) applied and was qualified
for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) was rejected despite these qualifi.cations; and (iv) the employer continued to seek applications from persons with the plaintiff's qualifications. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (articulating the test
in terms of racial minorities); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981)
(applying the test to sex discrimination). For application of the McDonnell Douglas test in lower
courts, see, e.g., Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979) (age discrimination);
Benerjee v. Board of Trustees, 495 F. Supp. 1148, 1153 (D. Mass. 1980) (race and national origin
discrimination), ajfd., 648 F.2d 61 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981).
Should the plaintiff succeed in making the above showing, the employer will be permitted to
rebut the prima facie test by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged practice (e.g., there were better qualified applicants than the plaintifi). See Burdine, 450
U.S. at 254. See generally Mendez, Presumptions of Discriminatory Motive in Title VII Disparate
Treatment Cases, 32 STAN. L. REv. 1129 (1980). The plaintiff may then attempt to show that
the articulated justification is merely a pretext for unlawful discrimination. Furnco Constr. Corp.
v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978); McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05.
12. Disparate impact discrimination may be proved by showing that a particular employer's
practices operate disproportionately to exclude members of a protected class. The analysis has
its roots in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). In the early evolution of discrimination cases, the plaintiff had to prove an evil motive or guilty intent. See Blumrosen, Strangers in
Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH.
L. REv. 59, 67-68 (1972). As courts began to wrestle with the problems inherent in proving a
state of mind, they gradually began to rely on objective criteria. See, e.g., Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970); Local 189, Papermakers v. United States, 416
F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 919 (1970); Gregory v. Litton Sys., 316 F. Supp.
401 (D. Cal. 1970), modified, 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972); Quarels v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F.
Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968). See generally Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High
Places, 95 HARV. L. REv. 945, 1004-23 (1982); Blumrosen, supra, at 66-75.
To establish a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination, the "plaintiff need only
show that the facially neutral standards in question select applicants for hire in a significantly
discriminatory pattern." Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977). The employer may
defend against Title VII liability by demonstrating that the practice is a business necessity. See,
e.g., Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432; Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d
1367 (9th Cir. 1979). The plaintiff may rebut by showing that there are other equally effective
hiring practices with fewer discriminatory effects. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 424 U.S.
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and has held that the preferential hiring practice is facially neutral.
This Part concludes that there is a clear basis for a disparate impact
finding only when the employer strictly enforces a Japanese citizenship
requirement. Part III considers whether the employer may successfully assert the appropriate Title VII defense - either the bona fide
occupational qualification (bfoq) exception to intentional discrimination or the business necessity defense to disparate impact discrimination - in the event that a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of
national origin discrimination. This Part concludes that, based on
unique attributes of Japanese management style and foreign trade considerations, the defenses should be available to an employer who turns
away an American lacking the requisite business and cultural familiarity. But, when the applicant is refused employment solely on the basis
of citizenship neither defense should be available. A citizenship requirement is usually an arbitrary prerequisite for job qualification and
is likely to be a pretext for national origin discrimination.
I.

INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION

Title VII explicitly forbids national origin discrimination.1 3 It is
unclear, however, from the terms of Title VII and its legislative history14 exactly what Congress had in mind by prohibiting discrimination on the basis of national origin. Whether a business and cultural
familiarity requirement or a citizenship requirement constitutes intentional national origin discrimination is open to question. 15 Both requirements are closely intertwined with an individual's national origin.
Thus, a business and cultural familiarity requirement could be viewed
as a pretext for intentional discrimination; however, this Part argues
that the legitimate business needs of foreign employers counsel against
such a narrow view. The citizenship requirement, by contrast, is overbroad if it purports to select employees with a requisite knowledge of
business and cultural familiarity. Because it is unreasonably exclusionary, a foreign employer's citizenship requirement should be regarded as national origin discrimination.
405, 425 (1975); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432; Kirby v. Colony Furniture Co., 613 F.2d 696, 703 (8th
Cir. 1980); Boyd v. Ozark Air Lines, 568 F.2d 50, 53-54 (8th Cir. 1977).
13. Title VII makes it "an unlawful employment practice for an employer • • • to fail or
refuse to hire . . . any individual .•. because of such individual's •.• national origin." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1982).
14. The legislative history of this section is sparse. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86,
88-89 (1973). One definition of national origin was given in a remark made on the floor of the
House of Representatives: "It means the country from which you or your forebears came • • • •
You may come from Poland, Czechoslovakia, England, France, or any other country." 110
CONG. REc. 2549 (1964). See also Espinoza, 414 U.S. at 89.
15. See note 9 supra.
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Imposing a Business and Cultural Familiarity Requirement

A nation's culture would seem to be the essence of its people's "national origin." Where the employer requires a high level of business
and cultural familiarity with Japanese culture, that requirement on its
face may be tantamount to national origin discrimination. The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has recognized this
by defining national origin discrimination to include those practices
based on "cultural or linguistic characteristics of a national origin
group." 16 Thus, a business and cultural familiarity requirement is arguably not a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for refusing employment.17 Even if a business and cultural familiarity requirement is not
directly equated with national origin discrimination, in the case of Japan there is a particularly strong reason to regard the requirement as a
pretext18 for intentional national origin discrimination. Because of Japan's homogeneous population, 19 those with the requisite knowledge
of Japanese culture either in Japan or the United States are most likely
to be of Japanese national origin. Thus, a court could find intentional
discrimination merely by inferring that the employer, aware of the obvious disparate impact, imposes the business and cultural familiarity
requirement solely for the purpose of hiring Japanese nationals. 20
For three reasons there is a better argument for the view that requiring business and cultural familiarity does not in itself constitute
national origin discrimination. First, it is unclear whether the construction of national origin discrimination that courts have embraced
prohibits reference to cultural characteristics. Courts have viewed
"national origin" as referring to "the country where a person was
born, or more broadly, the country from which his or her ancestors
came."21 Further, the EEOC offers this view as an alternative to the
definition of national origin discrimination that relies on cultural characteristics.22 Thus, the courts~ use of "national origin" may suggest a
narrow construction of the term, one that is limited to discrimination
16. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (1983).
17. Under this argument, an employer could never rebut a prima facie case of discrimination.
See note 11 supra.
18. The pretext argument arises in disparate treatment cases when a plaintiff puts in issue the
employer's justification for the challenged action. It is the third step of a three-step analysis
(employee's prima facie showing of discrimination; employer justification; employee's showing of
pretext). See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973); note 11 supra.
19. As of 1971, more than 99% of Japan's population was comprised of people of Japanese
origin. See D. WHITAKER, AREA HANDBOOK FOR JAPAN 70 (3d ed. 1974).
20. Such an elongated method of proof, however, is precisely what the Supreme Court held
unnecessary in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). By eliminating the need to
prove intent (even if only circumstantially through evidence establishing knowledge of discriminatory impact), the Court lessened plaintiffs' burden.
21. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 88-89 (1973).
22. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (1983). See text at note 16 supra.
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based on place of birth or ancestry and that would not embrace discrimination based on cultural characteristics.
Second, even if national origin discrimination embraces discrimination based on cultural characteristics, the Japanese employer's requirement is distinguishable from the proscribed discrimination. The
EEOC guidelines prohibit discrimination on the basis of cultural or
linguistic characteristics that an individual possesses or, as here, does
not possess. 23 The guidelines' apparent focus is on those characteristics that may be perceived as immutable in members of a given national origin group and unobtainable by those not of that group. This
interpretation of the guidelines is consistent with Title VIl's purpose
to end discrimination on the basis of arbitrary characteristics beyond a
person's control. 24 The Japanese employer's requirement falls outside
the prohibition so interpreted because the requirement is merely that
the applicant have requisite knowledge of Japanese culture, language
and business practices, not that the applicant possess such knowledge
by virtue of being Japanese born. 25
Third, if reference to cultural familiarity is not explicitly prohibited by Title VII and EEOC guidelines, inferring "intent" from the use
of such a hiring requirment would be improper. Inferring intent from
knowledge of disparate impact might make the existence of prohibited
discrimination turn on the degree of ethnic homogeneity of the employer's home country. For example, where the population of the parent country, and, consequently, those most likely to be familiar with
its culture, is comprised of people of diverse ancestral roots, there
would be no inference of discriminatory motive from a cultural familiarity requirement. 26 In such a case, there would be no substantial likelihood that the familiarity requirement would favor one national
23. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (1983).
24. The imposition of special disabilities upon members of a particular class would seem to
violate "the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should have some relationship to
individual responsibility." Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972). See
also San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1972) (fourteenth amendment
strict scrutiny test does not apply for the protection of people who are not saddled with a disability or subject to a history of purposeful unequal treatment); Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 269
(5th Cir. 1980) ("Save for religion, the discrimination on which the Act focuses its laser of prohibition are those that are ..• beyond the victim's power to alter •••."), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1113 (1981).
25. See, e.g., Mahroom v. Alexander, 22 Empl. Prac. Dec. ~ 30,580 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
26. For example, if an English firm operated in the United States and its work force of Eng·
lish citizens consisted of English-Africans, English-Arabs, English-Italians, etc., no inference of
intent to discriminate on the basis of national origin would be possible. But, if a Japanese firm in
the United States hired only Japanese citizens there would be a strong inference of discriminatory
intent because most Japanese citizens are also of Japanese national origin. Thus, the practice of
inferring discriminatory intent leads to different results for employers using business and cultural
familiarity or citizenship requirements depending on the ethnic homogeneity or heterogeneity of
the employer's home country.
One way to avoid this problem would be to hold that a citizenship requirement prohibits
national origin discrimination no matter how homogeneous or heterogeneous the ethnic population of the employer's country. However, citizenship requirements are not explicitly prohibited
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origin group over another. By contrast, Japan's population is homogenous;27 a business and cultural familiarity requirement favors one national origin group over another because of this homogeneity. Thus,
where two employers could have the same hiring practice, it would be
anomalous to arrive at an inference of discriminatory intent for only
one of them. Yet precisely such a result would occur if the prohibited
discriminatory intent were inferred from the ethnic homogeneity of
the employer's home country.
Finally, an employer may have legitimate reasons for instituting a
business and cultural familiarity requirement. 28 Particularly during
the early stages of the employer's involvement in the United States,
insisting that employees in key positions be familiar with the culture
and language of the parent's country rests on sound business policy;
key employees of the new subsidiary will be responsible for communicating with the parent and implementing the parent's policies and
management style. 29 Treaty trader provisions of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) 30 recognize employers' needs in this regard by
by Title VII. See Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973). But see notes 42-46 infra and
accompanying text.
Another way to avoid the above problem would be simply to refuse to infer discriminatory
intent and instead apply a discriminatory effect - disparate impact - test to the employer's
practices. See note 20 supra.
27. See note 19 supra.
28. See note 11 supra.
29. Among Japanese owned manufacturing companies polled by the Japan External Trade
Organization (JETRO), those that hire a high percentage of Japanese do so only during the
initial stages of the firm's existence in the United States: "the tendency is to reduce the number
of such personnel once normal production is under way." Brief for the Japanese External Trade
Organization as Amicus Curiae at 11, Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176
(1982) [hereinafter cited as JETRO Brief] (citing JAPAN EXTERNAL TRADE ORGANIZATION,
JAPANESE MANUFACTURING OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 37 (1980)).
30. 8 U.S.C. § 110l(a)(l5)(E)(l) (198i).
Article VIII(l) of the FCN Treaty confers on Japanese companies doing business in the
United States the right to engage certain employees of their choice. FCN Treaty, supra note 4, at
2070. These employees are admitted to the United States under the "treaty trader'' provisions of
the INA. 8 U.S.C. § 110l(a)(l5)(E)(i) (1982). See also 8 U.S.C. § 110l(a)(l5)(L) (1982) (intracompany transfers). The Supreme Court decision in Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano,
457 U.S 176 (1982), denies domestically incorporated Japanese subsidiaries the right to assert the
hiring preferences allowed by article VIII(l) of the FCN Treaty. See note 4 supra.
Home-country employees may still enter the United States, however, under the provisions of
article I of the FCN Treaty. This article provides that "[n]ationals of either Party shall be permitted to enter the territories of the other Party and to remain therein . . . for the purpose of
carrying on trade between the territories of the two Parties." FCN Treaty, supra note 4, at 2066.
The "treaty trader'' provisions of the INA have been administratively applied to all applicants
seeking employment in companies "in which the majority ownership interest is held by persons
having the nationality of the visa applicant, irrespective of the place of incorporation." Brief for
the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6, Sumitomo, 457 U.S. 176 (emphasis added). See also 22
C.F.R. § 41.40(a)(2) (1984) (home-country employees may not enter the United States under the
"treaty trader'' provisions unless they "will be engaged in duties of a supervisory or executive
character," or if they are employed in a minor capacity, they have "the specific qualifications that
will make [their] services essential to the efficient operation of the employer's enterprise").
As a practical matter, the Department of State will consider, when deciding whether to issue
"treaty trader'' visas, such factors as the title of home-country employees' positions, the location
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operating to admit foreign employees to the United States only when
they are important to the employer's operations. Thus, a court should
find that legitimate reasons support the business and cultural familiarity requirement where direct evidence of a discriminatory motive is
absent.
B. Imposing a Strict Citizenship Requirement
Rather than imposing a business and cultural familiarity requirement, the employer might flatly require all employees in certain positions to be Japanese citizens. Two arguments suggest that employers
requiring citizenship will be sheltered from claims that such a requirement constitutes intentional national origin discrimination. First,
courts appear hesitant to find national origin discrimination on the
basis of a citizenship requirement alone. The Supreme Court held in
Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co. 31 that the ban on national origin
discrimination in Title VII does not embrace citizenship requirements. 32 Other courts referring to Espinoza have given it a literal interpretation, concluding that a citizenship requirement standing alone
can never be the basis for finding national origin discrimination. 33
Thus, it appears that a strict citizenship requirement, on its face, is
insulated from Title VII. 34
Second, absent direct evidence of intentional national origin disof their jobs in the firm's organizational structure, the duties and skills involved, and the degree
to which home-country employees have ultimate control and responsibility for the firm's overall
operations. See State Department Instructions of July 10, 1981 To Diplomatic and Consular
Posts Regarding Treaty Trader Visas, reprinted in Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
at app. A, 3a, Sumitomo, 476 U.S. 176. The effect of the "treaty trader" provision is to admit
home-country employees only when they are important to the firm's operations in the United
States. Therefore, the "treaty trader'' provision ultimately enhances the firm's efficiency because
it allows intercountry transfers of key personnel.
31. 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
32. 414 U.S. at 95. AtJssue in Espinoza was whether an American employer who imposed a
United States citizenship requirement violated Title VIl's prohibition of national origin discrimi·
nation. 414 U.S. at 87-88 (1973).
33. See Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113
(1981); Vicedomini v. Alitalia Airlines, 33 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH), 11 34,119 (S.D.N.Y. 1983);
Dowling v. United States, 476 F. Supp. 1018 (D. Mass. 1979); Novak v. World Bank, 20 Empl.
Prac. Dec. (CCH), 11 30,021 (D.D.C. 1979).
34. In Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973), the American employer imposed an
American citizenship requirement on employees. The Court upheld the preference on grounds
that "nothing in the Act makes it illegal to discriminate on the basis of citizenship or alienage."
414 U.S. at 95. Additionally, the Court upheld the citizenship requirement because the employer
did not follow different policies for the foreign-born American citizens and for American citizens
born in the United States - the hiring preference was applied regardless of birthplace. 414 U.S.
at 94 n.6. One effect of the citizenship requirement in Espinoza was preference of American
citizens to the exclusion of noncitizens of all national origins - some of whom presumably were
of American ancestry but not American citizens. The justifications offered by the Court in Esp/·
noza can also be asserted on behalf of Japanese employers. First, the Japanese employer does not
have a different policy for the foreign born and for those born in Japan - the hiring preference
requires that all employees be Japanese citizens. Second, a foreign employer who imposes a
home-country citizenship requirement follows a practice similar to that of its American counter-
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crimination, a Japanese citizenship requirement may not constitute a
pretext for national origin discrimination. While Espinoza left open
the possibility that a citizenship hiring preference might be national
origin discrimination if it were but one part of a wider scheme of unlawful national origin discrimination,35 it is clear from the Court's
holding that such a preference does not automatically give rise to national origin discrimination.
Perhaps a court could find intentional discrimination by imputing
to the employer knowledge that the citizenship requirement will have
the practical effect of selecting only Japanese nationals. 36 The court
could then infer from the employer's knowledge in this regard an intent to impose the requirement as a pretext for national origin discrimination. 37 But, as with the business and cultural familiarity
requirement, inferring intent on the basis of the citizenship requirement would likely make the existence of prohibited discrimination
turn on the ethnic homogeneity of the home country population. 38
Moreover, the "treaty trader" provisions of the INA39 act as a restraint on the employers' practices because they admit Japanese citizens only if they are executives or supervisors, or specialists who are
essential to the firm's operations. Finally, legitimate reasons may motivate a citizenship requirement. Insisting that employees in key positions be Japanese citizens may be the easiest and most efficient means
of insuring business and cultural familiarity. 40 For these reasons,
then, a court might require a clear showing of intent before finding
national origin discrimination.
But the argument for finding national origin discrimination when
the employer flatly requires Japanese citizenship as a condition of employment is more compelling. Despite apparent judicial trends to the
contrary,41 requiring citizenship may constitute per se national origin
discrimination. A citizenship requirement, while perhaps providing
employers with a shortcut to select qualified applicants, is unnecessarily concerned with how the applicant came to possess knowledge of
Japanese business and culture, i.e., being born into and growing up in
the Japanese culture, rather than with whether the applicant actually
has such knowledge. The citizenship requirement, therefore, is largely
based on an accidental part of a person's life42 and unnecessarily expart: the hiring practice prefers Japanese citizens to the exclusion of noncitizens of all national
origins - including those of Japanese national origin but not Japanese citizens.
35. 414 U.S. at 92.
.
36. See text at note 27 supra.
37. See notes 18-20 supra and accompanying text.
38. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
39. See note 30 supra.
40. It provides the employer with a "short cut" method to select employees.
41. See notes 31-33 supra and accompanying text.
42. Citizenship, while not an immutable characteristic such as race or sex, is usually deter-
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eludes Americans with the requisite business and cultural familiarity.
Moreover, Espinoza's43 validation of a United States citizenship requirement need not be interpreted as permitting a foreign employer's
citizenship requirement. 44 A principled distinction exists between em'ployers who require United States citizenship and those who require
foreign citizenship. Implicit in Title VII must be the recognition that
American citizens 45 should be protected from discrimination based on
their national origin. A foreign citizenship requirement, however, discriminates against almost all American citizens. The foreign citizenship requirement, because it is so exclusionary, should be deemed "a
pretext to disguise what is in fact national origin discrimination." 4 6
II.

DISPARATE IMPACT

That an employer's practice does not constitute intentional national origin discrimination will not end the inquiry into whether Title
VII proscribes the practice. A court might conclude that neither a
Japanese employer's cultural familiarity requirement nor a Japanese
citizenship requirement is tantamount to intentional national origin
discrimination; but, if either practice results in a disparate impact on a
protected group, the practice may still be prohibited under Title VII
despite the absence of discriminatory intent. 47 To establish disparate
impact, an applicant need only show that facially neutral standards
select employees for hire in a significantly discriminatory pattern.
This Part assumes that the Japanese employer's practice has been held
facially neutral and examines whether disparate impact exists. It concludes that there is a clear basis for a disparate impact finding only
where the employer adopts a Japanese citizenship requirement.
mined by the accident of birth. Title VII is designed to prohibit discrimination that is based on
accidental characteristics. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
43. In Espinoza, 96% of the company's employees, though American citizens, were of Mexican ancestry. 414 U.S. at 93. The plaintiff in the suit, a Mexican citizen, claimed that the com·
pany's policy of hiring only American citizens constituted national-origin discrimination.
Unpersuaded by this claim, the Court held that the company's "policy against employment of
aliens [did not have] the purpose or effect of discriminating against persons of Mexican national
origin." 414 U.S. at 92 (footnote o~tted).
44. In Espinoza, in addition to noting that a United States citizenship requirement does not
deny employment to Americans of particular national origins, the Court also found strong prudential reasons to justify the requirement. For example, the Court found that "to interpret the
term 'national origin' to embrace citizenship requirements would require us to conclude that
Congress itself has repeatedly flouted its own declaration of policy" barring aliens from federal
employment. 414 U.S. at 90. The anomaly the Court saw in applying Title VII to an American
citizenship requirement does not hold in the foreign employer context. Thus, Espinoza need not
be read as validating a foreign citizenship requirement.
45. Although Title VII was primarily designed to protect minorities, see Sethi & Swanson,
supra note 10, at 485, at the heart of Title VII must be the concern to provide all persons within
the United States, both aliens and Americans, a right to equal opportunity in employment. See
42 u.s.c. § 2000e-1 (1982).
46. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 92 (1973).
47. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
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A. Business and Cultural Familiarity
It seems obvious that requiring applicants to be familiar with Japanese business and culture would have a significant exclusionary effect
on persons not of Japanese national origin. Presumably a business and
cultural familiarity requirement will disqualify a large percentage of
Americans who lack the requisite familiarity, but who would otherwise be qualified for management positions.
However, the Japanese employer with a business and cultural familiarity requirement may have a compelling argument against finding
disparate impact. The employer could argue that business and cultural familiarity is a special qualification necessary to perform particular jobs.48 The employer might then assert that, for purposes of
determining disparate impact, the proper statistical comparison
should be with that portion of the labor market whose members possess the necessary qualifications. 49 If the employer's work force reflects the percentage of Americans who possess business and cultural
familiarity with Japan,50 then no discriminatory impact exists.
B.

Citizenship Requirement

A disparate impact violation is more clearly evident when the employer requires Japanese citizenship than when the employer merely
requires familiarity with Japanese business and culture. Because almost all Japanese citizens are also of Japanese national origin, 51 very
few people not of Japanese origin will qualify for employment. The
citizenship requirement in effect excludes all potential applicants who
are not of Japanese descent. While the ethnic homogeneity of the employer's home country should be irrelevant to the question of discriminatory intent, 52 it is the focal point for determining impact. 53 Unless
an employer can claim that Japanese citizens are uniquely qualified to
48. See notes 98-111 infra and accompanying text.
49. In Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977), Justice Stewart explained that if "special qualifications are required to fill particular jobs," then the proper comparison for purposes of determining discriminatory impact may be with that portion of the labor
market whose members "possess the necessary qualifications." 433 U.S. at 308 n.13. If the
specialized portion of the foreign employer's work force is drawn from applicants who possess
unique qualifications, and if the employer's work force reflects the percentage of other national
origin groups who possess the necessary qualifications, then arguably no discriminatory impact
occurs under Hazelwood. For a general discussion of relevant labor market analysis see Shoben,

Probing the Discriminatory Effects ofEmployee Selection Procedures with Disparate Impact Analysis Under Title VII. 56 Tux. L. REv. 1 (1977).
50. To attain this proportional representation and thus avail itself of the Hazelwood analysis,
see note 49 supra, the foreign corporation would most likely have to recruit Americans with the
requisite business and cultural familiarity.
51. See note 19 supra.
52. See text following note 25 supra.
53. Disparate impact analysis focuses solely on the results of given practice. It is not so
much concerned with how or why the results came about. See note 12 supra.
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perform particular jobs,54 a citizenship requirement cannot in itself
represent a legitimate job qualification55 for purposes of defining the
relevant labor market. 56 It is, therefore, very difficult for the Japanese
employer to deny that the citizenship requirement has a disparate impact on national origin grounds. 57
III.

DEFENSES

An employer's hiring practice that constitutes a prima facie case of
prohibited discrimination may nonetheless be excused by Title VII
under one of two defenses, depending upon which ground a court bases its finding of discrimination. When the court finds intentional discrimination, the employer may assert the bfoq exception to liability; 58
when there is disparate impact discrimination, the business necessity
defense may apply.59
While Parts I and II of this Note discuss whether the prohibition
against national origin discrimination in Title VII embraces a business
and cultural familiarity requirement or a Japanese citizenship requirement, Part III assumes for the sake of argument that a court finds each
of the hiring practices discriminatory. This Part then assesses whether
the employer can successfully defend the challenged hiring practice
and thereby avoid a Title VII violation. Based on an examination of
Japanese management practices, treaty rights and trade policy, this
Part argues that courts should establish a presumption that the appropriate defense is met in the case of the employer requiring business and
cultural familiarity and hiring employees under the "treaty trader"
provisions60 of the INA. An employer who requires citizenship is not
entitled to such a presumption and indeed will not be able to establish
a Title VII defense.
54. See text at notes 98-111 infra.
55. See text at note 39 supra.
56. See note 49 supra.
57. Unless, of course, the court takes a very broad approach to defining the portion of the
employer's workforce subject to the statistical comparison. In cases like Sumitomo, for example,
at issue is the employer's right to fill executive or sales positions with Japanese nationals. See
N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1982, at Dl, col. 3. However, the proportion of all Japanese employees to all
American employees may be very small indeed. One poll conducted by the JETRO found that
among Japanese-owned manufacturing companies polled in the survey, only 2.5 % of the employees were Japanese. See JETRO Brief, supra note 29, at 11. Thus, if a court defined the
foreign employer's entire workforce as "the portion" subject to the statistical comparison, the
percentage of Japanese citizens might be so small that no disparate impact would be found to
exist. By contrast, if a court defined only executive positions as the portion subject to the statistical comparison, then the disparate impact on national origin might well be great enough to find a
Title VII violation.
58. See notes 61-65 infra and accompanying text.
59. See notes 98-106 infra and accompanying text.
60. See note 30 supra.

October 1984]

Note -

Job Discrimination Against American Citizens

249

A. Business and Cultural Familiarity Requirement
1. Bona Fide Occupational Qualification
The bfoq exception permits intentional discrimination if the discriminatory practice is reasonably necessary to the normal operation
of the employer's business. 61 Although explicitly provided for by the
language of Title VII, 62 the exception is strictly construed. 63 The defense is meant to accommodate legitimate business needs 64 and therefore requires the employer to prove that there was a reasonable basis
to believe that all or substantially all of the protected class cannot perform the job safely or efficiently, or that it is impossible or highly impractical to deal with the class on an individual basis. 65 For three
reasons, a foreign employer requiring a business and cultural familiarity requirement should be entitled to a presumption that the defense is
met, particularly during the early stages of its business operations in
the United States.
First, the unique attributes of Japanese management may alone
provide the basis for the bfoq exception. 66 The differences between
61. Although the statutory language of Title VII speaks only to hiring and firing, the bfoq
also applies to opportunities for advancement. See Fisher v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 613
F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1980) (Title VII applies to promotions from nonmanagerial to managerial
positions), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1115 (1981); Gilmore v. Kansas City Terminal Ry., 509 F.2d 48
(8th Cir. 1975) (Title VII appplies to employment policies affecting supervisory and managerial
positions).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e·(2)(e) (1982).
63. See Dothard v. Rawlinson 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977) ("the bfoq exception was in fact
meant to be an extremely narrow exception to the general prohibition of discrimination on the
basis of sex"); see also Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 387 (5th Cir.) (EEOC
guidelines indicate that the bfoq is to be narrowly construed), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971);
Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969) (criticizing broad
construction ofbfoq). But see Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 272 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Ind. 1967)
(employer has discretionary prerogatives to determine a bfoq), affd. in pan, revd. in part on other
grounds, 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
64. Some courts use the language that the bfoq must be "reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business," while others state that the requirement must go to the
"essence of the business operation." Compare Rosen v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 328 F.
Supp 454, 462 (D.N.J.), remanded on other grounds. 411 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1972), with Diaz v. Pan
Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
65. See, e.g., Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, 649 F.2d 670, 676 (9th Cir. 1980); Usery v.
Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531F.2d224, 236 (5th Cir. 1976); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel.
Co, 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969); Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 428 F. Supp. 573,
578 (D. Del. 1977). See also Developments in the Law: Employment Discrimination and Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1109, 1179-80 (1971) (criticizing the
application of an "all or substantially all" test because it does not protect those individuals who
are qualified to perform the functions).
66. In Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981), vacated, 451
U.S. 176 (1982), the Second Circuit noted that consideration of the bfoq exception to Title VII
liability must give
due weight to the ..• unique requirements of a Japanese company doing business in the
United States, including such factors as a person's (1) Japanese linguistic and cultural skills,
(2) knowledge of Japanese products, markets, customs, and business practices, (3) familiarity with the personnel and workings of the principal or parent enterprise in Japan, and (4)
acceptability to those persons with whom the company or branch does business.
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Japanese managerial practices and American practices67 are striking. 6 s
Japanese managerial policies are deeply rooted in tradition and culture. 69 The integration between management practices and cultural
values70 explains, at least in part, the success Japanese business has
had in maintaining healthy, dynamic growth. 71 American managers
are often perceived by Japanese to be too eager for career development
and not well suited to maintain the harmony of the Japanese system. 72
As a consequence, Japanese goals of promoting a "people oriented"
managerial outlook may be undercut by an American system, which
to some at least, treats employees as disposable "direct labor costs." 73
Imposition of a business and cultural familiarity requirement is necessary, then, to insure that managers can successfully integrate the Japanese management style with American practices. 74 The practice can
be defended as a bfoq because the Japanese management style seems to
represent the very essence of Japanese business operations. 75
Specialist positions in Japanese trading companies76 present an
638 F.2d at 559.
67. The success Japanese have had in turning around at least one American plant illustrates
the difference between traditional Japanese and American management practices. See Japanese
Tum Kansas Plant into a Success, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1983, at 1, col. 2.
Japanese executives also achieve their positions by means starkly different from those used by
United States executives. While typical United States executives may change jobs three or four
times before becoming corporate officers, their Japanese counterparts tend to spend 21 years in
the same company before advancing to the status of corporate executive. See Tsurumi, U.S.
Managers are "Technically I/literate and Out of Touch, AM. PERSPECTIVE, Aug. 1983, at 13-14.
68. The Japanese managerial style may be distinguished from the American managerial style
on the basis of four characteristics. In Japan, information flows from lower management to upper
management. Second, top management facilitates decisionmaking in lower management. Third,
middle management is used to develop solutions to problems. And finally, consensus is stressed
as the way of making all decisions. Johnson and Ouchi, Made in America (Under Japanese
Management), HARV. Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1974, at 61. See generally Barrett & Gehrke, Significant Differences Between Japanese and American Business, MSU Bus. TOPICS, Winter 1974, at
41.
69. See Drucker, What We Can Learn From Japanese Management, HARV. Bus. REV.,
Mar.-Apr. 1971, at 110. See generally Sethi, Drawbacks of Japanese Management, Bus. WK.,
Nov. 24, 1973, at 12.
70. Japanese managers seek to promote harmony among employees and loyalty to the company. Communication within a Japanese company tends to be vague and general so that opportunities for disharmony and conflict are limited. Sees. SETHI, JAPANESE BUSINESS AND SOCIAL
CoNFLICT 56 (1975).
71. Sees. SETHI, supra note 70, at 70-71; M. MORISHIMA, WHY HAS JAPAN "SUCCEEDED"?
193 (1982); cf. Johnson & Ouchi, supra note 68, at 60.
72. See, e.g., Tsurumi, supra note 67, at 13-14; N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1982, at 33, col. 3 (remarks of Yoshitaka Sajima, General Manager, Mitsui & Co.).
73. See Tsurumi, supra note 67, at 13.
74. One study suggests that Japanese are able to avoid conflicts of management style in their
United States operations by placing Japanese in key slots. See Johnson & Ouchi, supra note 68,
at 68.
75. See note 68 supra.
76. Sumitomo Shoji is one such Japanese trading company. The other major trading companies are Mitsubishi, Nissho-Iwai, Mitsui, C. Itoh, Marubeni, Toyo Menka Kaisha, KanematsuGosho, and Nichimen. See Weigner, Outward Bound, FORBES, July 4, 1983, at 96-97.
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even stronger argument for finding a bfoq. Specialist positions, such
as sales positions, are uniquely adapted to the Japanese style of doing
business. 77 Japanese trading companies develop new business ventures
both domestically and internationally. An important component of
the Japanese economy,78 these sogo shosha 19 develop information networks that allow the companies to form vital links between the Japanese, who would otherwise be isolated because of cultural and
linguistic barriers, and the world market. 80 Typical Japanese traders
undergo a ten-year career development program and must be familiar
with the monetary systems, culture and products of the countries with
which they trade. 81 Thus a business and cultural familiarity requirement for these positions, even under a bfoq exception strictly construed, 82 would seem to be justified.
Another reason for establishing a bfoq based on a business and
cultural familiarity requirement rests on the sound trade policy of promoting foreign investment in the United States. 83 The United States
encourages foreign investment because it creates jobs for United States
workers, 84 broadens capital markets, and contributes to productivity
and economic growth. 85 Establishing a bfoq for key positions may
obviate the otherwise chilling effect that imposition of Title VII could
77. See generally K. HITANI, THE JAPANESE EcONOMIC SYSTEM (1976).
78. Together, the nine trading companies accounted for 30% of Japan's gross national product in 1982. See Weigner, supra note 76, at 96.
79. Sogo shosha refers collectively to the nine trading companies cited in note 76 supra. See
Wall St. J., July 18, 1983, at 19, col. 3.
80. See K. HITANI, supra note 77, at 130.
81. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1982, at D6, col. 4.
82. See note 63 supra. But cj Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 638 F.2d 552, 559 (2d
Cir. 1981) (suggestions that bfoq should be broadened to include language skills and business and
cultural familiarity with the parent country), vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 176 (1982). See
note 66 supra.
83. In many cases, the Japanese are motivated to invest directly in the United States - and
manufacture products in, rather than export products to the United States - by a desire to avoid
trade friction. See JAPAN PROFILE, supra note 2, at 2. Another reason the Japanese invest in
industrialized countries such as the United States is the desire to gain access to local markets.
See Makoto, Japanese Investment Abroad, in CONFERENCE ON THE JAPANESE EcONOMY AND
THE EcONOMIC RELATION OF AUSTRALIA AND JAPAN, SHARPENING THE Focus 55 (R. Walton ed. 1977). Increases in Japanese investment abroad seem inevitable since the growth of the
Japanese economy is closely tied to exports. As direct foreign investment increases, efforts to
secure and develop export markets will be stepped up. See HAMADA, JAPANESE INVESTMENT
ABROAD: EcONOMIC AND SOCIAL STUDIES IN DEVELOPMENT 163 (1974).
84. Japanese direct investment in the United States has been significant - rising from $152
million in 1973 to $4.2 billion by 1980. See JETRO BRIEF, supra note 29, at 6. As a consequence of Japanese direct investment, an estimated 261,600 jobs for Americans have been created
by Japanese companies employing approximately 10,500 Japanese nationals. JAPAN SOCIETY,
INC., EcONOMIC IMPACT OF THE JAPANESE BUSINESS CoMMUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES 1
(1979).
85. See Federal Response to OPEC Country Investments in the United States: Hearings Before

the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 123 (1981) (Statement of Marc E. Leland, Asst. Secy. of
Treasury for Intl. Affairs).
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have on direct foreign investment. 86 Japan's Ministry of International
Trade and Industry takes the position "that the ability of Japanese
investors to dispatch executive employees from Japan to manage and
control their overseas subsidiaries is of greatest importance and is indeed a basic prerequisite to the successful management of their overseas business activities." 87 Allowing Japanese employers the
unfettered discretion to fill the positions of key employees encourages
the important trade policy of increasing direct foreign investment.
Furthermore, the protections afforded by admitting into the United
States only those employees who qualify for "treaty trader" status insures that, at least facially, the requirements of the bfoq are met.
The rigid "treaty trader" requirements88 foreign employees must
meet before entering the United States - requirements designed to
admit them only if they are executives or supervisors, or specialists
essential to the firm's operation - suggest that a business and cultural
familiarity requirement should be presumptively established as a bfoq.
The "treaty trader" provisions of the INA were created to guarantee
rights of entry to persons who function in international commerce89
under Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation (FCN) Treaties. 90
86. For [multinational corporations], the Sumitomo case raises some of the most sticky
issues of foreign trade policy. Many believe it could have a chilling effect both on Japan's
direct investment in the United States - $6.5 billion as of the end of 1981 - and on the
investment policies of other countries as well.
N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1982, at Dl, col. 3.
87. Brief of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry of the Government of Japan,
Amicus Curiae, at 6, Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 452 U.S. 176 (1982).
88. See note 30 supra.
89. See Walker, Modem Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, 42 MINN. L.
REv. 805, 813 & n.18 (1958).
90. Article I of the United States-Japan FCN Treaty, note 4 supra, provides, for example,
that "[n]ationals of either Party shall be permitted to enter the territories of the other Party and
to remain therein • • . for the purpose of carrying on trade between the territories of the two
Parties." Home-country citizens entering the United States under this provision must first conform to the INA's "treaty trader" requirements. See note 30 supra.
FCN treaties are bilateral treaties used to establish ground rules governing trade between two
countries. See Walker, supra note 89.
In a real sense . . . the FCN treaty as a whole is an investment treaty; not a mosaic which
merely contains discrete investment segments. It regards and treats investments as a process
inextricably woven into the fabric of human affairs generally; and its premise is that investment is inadequately dealt with unless set in the total "climate" in which it is to exist.
Walker, Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Investment: Present United
States Practices, 5 AM. J. CoMP. L. 229, 244 (1956) (emphasis in original). The United States is a
party to numerous FCN treaties containing language substantially similar to article I of the
United States-Japan FCN Treaty. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Establishment, and Navigation,
Feb. 21, 1961, United States-Belgium, art. II, 14 U.S.T. 1284, T.I.A.S. No. 5432; Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Oct. l, 1951, United States-Denmark, art. II, 12 U.S.T.
908, T.I.A.S. No. 4797; Convention of Establishment, Protocol, and Declaration, Nov. 25, 1959,
United States-France, art. II, 11 U.S.T. 2398, T.I.A.S. No. 4625; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Oct. 29, 1954, United States-Fed. Rep. of Germany, art. II, 7 U.S.T.
1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Aug. 3, Dec. 26,
1951, United States-Greece, art. II, 5 U.S.T. 1829; T.I.A.S. No. 3057; Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights, Aug. 15, 1955, United States-Iran, art. II, 8 U.S.T. 899,
T.I.A.S. No. 3853; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Aug. 23, 1951, United
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Since foreign employees are admitted to the United States as treaty
traders only upon demonstrating compliance with criteria similar to
those necessary to establish a business and cutural familiarity requirement as a bfoq, 91 the employer should be entitled to a presumption
that "treaty trader" status itself triggers a bfoq.
Courts have, in the past, utilized a judicially created presumption
for Title VII suits.92 Creating a presumption of defense to Title VII
violations for foreign employers who hire home-country citizens meeting "treaty trader" requirements places the burden of proof on the
plaintiff93 to assert the non-applicability of the defense. Such a presumption is warranted because it protects the full breadth of treaty
rights,9 4 accommodates business differences,95 encourages foreign investment,96 yet still preserves Title VII's goal of eliminating invidious
forms of discrimination. 97
States-Israel, art. II, 5 U.S.T. 550, T.I.A.S. No. 2948; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and
Navigation, Nov. 28, 1956, United States-Korea, art. II, 8 U.S.T. 2217, T.I.A.S. No. 3947;
Treaty of Friendship, Establishment, and Navigation, Feb. 23, 1962, United States-Luxembourg,
art. II, 14 U.S.T. 251, T.I.A.S. No. 5306; Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular
Rights, Dec. 20, 1958, United States-Muscat and Oman, art. II, 11 U.S.T. 1835, T.I.A.S. No.
4530; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Mar. 27, 1956, United States-Netherlands, art. II, 8 U.S.T. 2043, T.I.A.S. No. 3942; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Jan. 21, 1956, United States-Nicaragua, art. II, 9 U.S.T. 449, T.I.A.S. No. 4024; Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce, and Protocol, Nov. 12, 1959, United States-Pakistan, art. II, 12 U.S.T.
110, T.I.A.S. No. 4683; Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations, Feb. 8, 1966, United StatesTogo, art. I, 18 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 6193; Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations, Apr. 3,
1961, United States-Vietnam, art. I, 12 U.S.T. 1703, T.I.A.S. No. 4890.
91. The requirements for "treaty trader" visas and for establishing a bfoq or business necessity are, of course, not identical. They overlap to the extent that they both consider, for example,
the duties and skills necessary to perform the job, the degree to which the employees will have
ultimate control and responsibility for the firm's overall operations, and for specialists, whether
the services are essential to the efficient operation of the business. See note 30 supra. They differ,
however, to the extent that a "treaty trader'' visa is issued upon the relatively cursory review of
an administrative consular officer, while the defenses to Title VII are usually established only
after a thorough inquiry, in an adversarial context, into the nature of the employer's business.
Establishing a presumption in favor of "treaty trader'' applicants may be justified on the ground
that it protects the full scope of FCN treaty rights of entry, but does not prevent a Title VII
plaintiff from making a more searching inquiry into the legitimacy of an employer's defense.
92. Courts have established a presumption of unlawful discriminatory treatment whenever
plaintiffs establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment discrimination. See 1 WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE 301-43 (1982). After a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination is established, the
burden of persuasion remains on the plaintiff, but the burden of production shifts to the defendant. The defendant may attempt to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case. See Texas Dept. of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-56 (1981). See generally Mendez, Presumptions of Discriminatory Motive in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1129
(1980).
93. Should the defendant fail to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case, he or she must normally
carry the burden of persuasion regarding the availability of an affirmative Title VII defense. See
text at note 65 supra. Creating a presumption of a Title VII defense will require the plaintiff to
carry the burden of proving that a defense is unavailable. See note 97 infra.
94. See notes 88-91 supra and accompanying text.
95. See notes 66-82 supra and accompanying text.
96. See notes 83-87 supra and accompanying text.
97. Establishing a presumption of defense to Title VII liability might appear to create con-

254

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 83:237

2. Business Necessity
The business necessity defense98 is similar to the bfoq defense in
the sense that it is also founded on the functional necessity of business
operations. 99 Unlike the bfoq, which is the explicit statutory defense,
the business necessity defense is a judicial creation. 100 It excuses employer practices that have a discriminatory impact, 101 but no discriminatory intent. 102 To establish a business necessity, the practice must
be necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the business. 103
flicting presumptions since courts presume unlawful discrimination whenever the plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment. See note 92 supra. But in fact the
presumptions do not conflict since the opposing parties do not both have the burden of persuasion at the same time as to a particular fact. Establishing a presumptive defense to Title VII
liability for employers who hire home-country citizens admitted under the "treaty trader" provision puts the burden of persuasion and production on the plaintiff to prove both a prima facie
case of unlawful discrimination and that a defense to Title VII liability is not available.
98. The business necessity defense allows an employer to maintain facially neutral employment standards that have the effect of discriminating against a protected class if the employer can
show that the standard in question measures legitimate qualifications for the job. See, e.g.,
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 43132 (1971); Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1376-79 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 928 (1980). If the employer fails to establish the business necessity, then the practice violates Title VII. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 402 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (If the practice has a
discriminatory impact and cannot be justified as a business necessity, the practice is prohibited.);
see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 266 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
99. "The leading employment discrimination cases have recognized that to justify a discriminatory policy as either a bona fide occupational qualification or a business necessity, the employer must at least show both a valid purpose and that the policy achieves that purpose • . • ."
Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, 649 F.2d 670, 680 (9th Cir. 1980). See also Blake v. City of
Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1376 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 928 (1980); Arritt v.
Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267, 1271 (4th Cir. 1977); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 38889 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel., 408 F.2d 228,
232 (5th Cir. 1969).
Harriss implies that the bfoq exception and the business necessity defense are very close to the
same thing, at least in terms of establishing a nexus between the business purpose and the employer's requirement. In the case of Japanese employers, if the nexus is sufficient to excuse a
discriminatory practice under the bfoq defense, it should also excuse the practice as a business
necessity.
100. The term "business necessity" was first coined in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 431 (1971). See Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed,
404 U.S. 1006 (1971), for a widely adopted formulation of the business necessity defense. For
further discussion and criticism of the business necessity defense, see Note, Business Necessity
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A No Alternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98
(1974); see also Note, The Business Necessity Defense to Disparate Impact Liability Under Title
VII, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 911 (1979).
101. See note 12 supra.
102. See Garcia v. Gloor, 609 F.2d 156, 163 (5th Cir. 1980).
103. See Chrisner v. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 645 F.2d 1251, 1262 (6th Cir. 1981); Parson v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 575 F.2d 1374, 1389 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
968 (1978), on remand, 497 F. Supp. 339 (E.D. La. 1980), affd., 727 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1984);
Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870, 879 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. St.
Louis-S. F. Ry. Co., 464 F.2d 301, 308 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116 (1973);
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971);
Neloms v. Southwestern Elec. Power Co., 440 F. Supp. 1353, 1370 (D. La. 1977); Iowa Dept. of
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"The practice must be essential, the purpose compelling;" 104 it is not
sufficient to show merely that "legitimate management functions" are
served. 105 There must be no other equally effective hiring practices
with fewer discriminatory effects.106
The arguments for establishing a presumptive bfoq defense apply
with equal force to the business necessity defense. First, preservation
of the unique Japanese management style goes beyond maintaining
"legitimate management functions"; 107 it arguably preserves the very
essence of the Japanese style of doing business. 108 Second, a business
necessity defense that embraces a business and cultural familiarity requirement will possibly overcome the otherwise chilling effect Title
VII might have on foreign investment. 109 Third, a foreign employee's
satisfaction of "treaty trader" requirements carries with it the recognition that the employee is necessary to the United States business operation.110 This is especially true for specialist positions where "treaty
trader" status is not granted if there are Americans who can also perform the job. 111 And finally, since the business and culture familiarity
requirement is arguably a ~ritical means of insuring that key employees possess the requisite Japanese management skills, it would not
seem that other equally effective hiring practices with fewer discriminatory effects exist.
B. Strict Citizenship Requirement

A strict citizenship requirement cannot be defended as either a
bfoq or a business necessity. In the context of Japanese employment
practices in the United States, a citizenship requirement is not a bfoq
because it is not properly related to any job skill one might be expected
to possess. Arguably an employer imposes such a requirement to insure the requisite business and cultural familiarity. But since it is not
impossible or even difficult to deal with job applicants on an individual
Social Servs., Iowa Men's Reformatory v. Iowa Merit Employment Dept., 261 N.W.2d 161, 167
(Iowa 1977).
104. Williams v. Colorado Springs, Colo. School Dist. 11, 641 F.2d 835, 842 (10th Cir.
1981); see also United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d Cir. 1971).
105. Muller v. United States Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923, 928 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 825 (1976). But see Leftwich v. United States Steel Corp., 470 F. Supp. 758 (D.C. Pa.
1979) (good business practices are a recognized defense to a Title VII disparate treatment
action).
106. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S 424, 432 (1971); Kirby v. Colony Furniture Co., 613 F.2d 696, 703 (8th Cir. 1980);
Boyd v. Ozark Air Lines, 568.F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1977).
107. See text at note 105 supra.
108. See text at notes 64, 66-82 supra.
109. See text at notes 83-87 supra.
110. See text at notes 30, 88-91 supra.
111. 22 C.F.R. § 41.40(a)(2) (1984).
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basis to test for such familiarity, a blanket exception is unjustified. 112
For the same reason, the business necessity defense also fails.
There are alternatives to a citizenship requirement which will effectively insure that employees possess the requisite qualifications, but
which will produce fewer discriminatory effects. 113 The least discriminatory and most effective way to insure business and cultural familiarity is to test for it. Many Americans who lack the citizenship
requirement will nonetheless possess the necessary familiarity with
Japanese business and culture. Thus the practice of an employer requiring Japanese citizenship cannot be excused.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decision in Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v.
Avagliano 114 has broad implications for foreign-owned businesses incorporated in the United States. Courts are forced to consider
whether a foreign employer's hiring preference for nationals of the
home country violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 115 A court
should not find national origin discrimination where an employer requires that employees be familiar with the business practices and culture of the home country. Even if a court does find that the
requirement constitutes national origin discrimination, the employer
should be able to defend successfully the requirement as a bona fide
occupational qualification or business necessity. But where the foreign
employer requires that its employees be citizens of the home country,
the hiring preference is more likely to be a pretext for national origin
discrimination and should be prohibited. Likewise, the practice
should not be defensible as a bona fide occupational qualification or
business necessity.

112. One requirement for establishing the bfoq is that it is impossible or highly impractical to
deal with the class on an individual basis. See, e.g., Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408
F.2d 228, 235 n.5 (5th Cir. 1969).
113. See text at note 106 supra.
114. 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
115. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).

